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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SET,-\VYN VANDERPOOL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

CASE NO.
11438

B. K. HARGIS, et al.,

Dcf cndant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Respondent Vandervool to collect money allegedly o-wed to him by B. K.
Hargis, et al., the appellants herein.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
On September 12, 1968, a jury trial was held, Honorabh· Merrill C. Fanx, judge, presiding, which resulted in
a verdict hy the jnry, dated September 16, 1968, awarding
plaintiff jndgment against B. K. Hargis, et al in the sum
of $!),5()0.00 (R 87). r_rhercafter, plaintiff made a Motion
to Compute Interest and Incorporate in Judgment (R.
85). Plaintiff's motion was heard on November 14, 1968,
and interl':,;t was added to the jndgment by an Order of
thP eo11rt dated November 6, 19G8 (R. 89).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that the verdict of the jury be reversed, or in the alternative, that the case be remanded
for a new trial. Respondent submits that the jury verdict
should be affirmed.
STATE:MENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts omits several important details and contains statements inconsistent with the
general rule that the Supreme Courts accepts as fact the
evidence which snrnJorts tlw jury verdict, and Respondent
therefore submits the follffwing statement of facts.
Appellant Hargis operated and owned a business
which sold chinchillas in various states. Hargis operated
the chinchilla business in Pennsylvania and adjoining
states under the name of The Chinchilla Guild of America,
Eastern Division (T. 181, Exhibits 13-P, 14-P), hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Guild," ·with Leo
Crowder managing the operation (T. 118, 197).
In the fall of 1965 Respondent Vanderpool began
working for the Guild as a salesman (T. 118, 197).
On December 24, 1965, pursuant to a request by
Hargis (rr. 122-124, 200, 201), Vanderpool loaned the
Guild $2,000.00 and rt>cf~fred in return a Promissory Note
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sign('d "'l'he Chinchilla Guild of America, Eastern Division, by Leo 1. Crffwder" ('T'. J 25, Exhibit 1-P).
On or ahont .Jannar.\- l, 19GG, Vanderpool, Hargis
and Appellant's attorney met in Las Vegas,
J'\PYada (T. 123). Shortly thereafter, the same persons
met in Salt Lake City, Utah. Subsequently, an instrument
\nLS prqiared and signed ·which purported to be an agreement lwtw(•pn Hargis, Vand(~rpool and Cro\vder (T. 131,
K"hihit 10-D).
Cnrw<lr~r

The purported agreement (Exhibit 10-D) contained
n lJlank in paragraph Fifth thereof and contained at the
end th<·n•of a writtPn condition precedent to its effectiveMss. Vanderpool, Hargis and Cro\Yder each testified
n·p1nling the condition (T. 130, 131, 134, 163, 165, 170,
0 ·) 1 °·• ')')' ') 1 ·' ')c±G nr::o 2r::1)
__ i10, __ t_), '-'-±-:t, .._,
)' Lir) ' ;,) _ •
I_·,)...,.,
\'arnleqiool and Crowder returned to Pennsylvania
(T.1::\1).
Punrnant to s<'nral requests by Hargis (T. 129, 1321:~{,) Y PndPrpool loaned the Guild $5,000.00 (Exhibit 4-P)
and n•c0in•d a $5,000.00 Promissory Note in return (T.
12!)- l:~fi, 2( 1~). Thr $5,000.00 Note was a form note, was
similnr to tl1c• $2,0lJ0.00 Note and was }Jayahle in 90 days
(T. 1:-l/).
On st·vc·ral occasions \Tnnderpool rt>qnested Hargis
tn pa:: Ill<-' two nofrs and rQCf~in'cl asc;urance from Hargis
tktt lf;1r;.;is \\ould [J<l:'-' the Notrs (T. 14G, 14G, 148-150).
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Crowder testified that Hargis stated that he would pay
Vanderpool the $7 ,000.00 ( T. 205). Hargis stated several
times that he would be responsible to Vanderpool for
payment of the notes (T. 134, 136, 146, 148).
Hargis stipulated that during the course of Vanderpool's employment Vanderpool earned commissions totaling $2,560.00 for which Vanderpool was not paid because
of alleged offsets (Pre-trial Order R. 26-29; T. 119, 265,
266).
Vanderpool filed a Complaint alleging that Hargis
owed him $2,000.00 plus interest on the one Promissory
Note, $5,000.00 plus interest on the other Promissory Note
and, among other things, $2,560.00 for commissions due
and owing (R. 2, 26-29).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT
10-D ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS NOR IN HAVING PREVIOUSLY REFUSED ITS ADMITTANCE.

Exhibit 10-D purported to be an agreement entered
into by and between Hargis, Vanderpool and Crowder.
However, the purported agreement was subject to a condition precedent which had to be perfonned before the
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ngreonwnt lwcame effective and before the parties thereto
lwea11w honnd thereby. The agreement, Exhibit 10-D, contained a blank in Paragra1Jh Fifth, and at the end thereof th<' following condition:
"H is agrePd that the copy of this contract is
not to become completely effective until the amount
owed to Hargis is filled in. All other provisions
appl:v."

Regarding the rondition precedent Vanderpool testithat the agreement never became effective because
the eendi ti on was never complied with (T. 131, 163-165,
J 70, J S:3). Hargis testified as follows:
fo~d

"Q.

(By Mr. Bishop) Mr. Hargis, was there any
discussion as to how Mr. Vanderpool and
Mr. Crowder were to be notified of the amount
to bP pnt in that particular blank?

A.

Yes, we woitld notify them in writing, as soon
as the audit was eomplefrd." (T. 244)

On vi or din~ examination Hargis testified as follows:

"Q.

(By Mr. Gottfredson) Did yon ever mail the
letter to Mr. Vanderpool?

A.

No.

Q.

Yon ;just stated, in yonr testimony, twice previomdy, did you not, that yon were to mail
notice to them?
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A.

This was mailed to Mr. Crowder, because o:
the fact that he stated, in his own testimom.
he was the office manager.
·

Q.

And isn't it true you han' never mailed notice
to Mr. Yanderpool, as-pursuant to what yoi
said just one minute ago1

A.

No, I have never mailt>d anything to Mr.
\Tandt>rpool, personally." (T. 246)

The letter which Hargis stated he was to send !1
Vanderpool and Cro-wcler to satisfiy the condition wa:
addressed to Crowder (Bxhibit 8-D) and, although Hargi·
testified that lw sent the letter (T. 242), Crowder dir
not remember receiYing it (T. 217, 221, 250, 251). Even
Appellant's attorney, who was present when the allegec
agreement was signed, referred to the cited provision ir
Exhibit 10-D as a "condition" (T. 244).
The general rule regarding conditions precedent ha!
been authoritatively stated as follows:
"In negotiating a contract the parties may im
pose any condition precedent, the performanc1
of which is essential before they become bouno
by tho agreement; in other words, there may bt
a condition precedent to the existence of a contract
17 Am. Jnr. 22, Contracts, Sec. 24, page 3GO.
A condition precedent is a fact or event whiclt
the parties intend must exist or take place befon
there is a right to performance. If the condition
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rn not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract
dci('S n()t com0 into existence." 'Vmison on Contract, Third Ed., Sec. Gr;::i, Pages 126-127.
'J1 he same general rule applie::; eyeu "When the condition \d1ich mu::;t tah place bPfore the agreement is effective lw,-; he<'n agreed u1wn orally, even though the agreenwnt its(•lf is in writing. See Nidtnll v. Berntson, 83 Utah
:i;i:i, :30 P.2d 7'.:lS and cases cited therein.
~ince th<! agreement contained a condition precedent,
tlt0 Appellant, who was asserting the validity of the
agTe('lllt'nt, had the burden of proving that the condition
Jrnd been eornplied with. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec.
J "JO, J>agz• 173. Ilosenulum v. Sun Life Assurance Comz)((n of Cannda, 65 P.2d '.:l99, 401, 51"Wyoming195. Until
.\ppdlant sustained tbe burden of proving that the condition had hc~t·n romplied with the Court properly refused
admi ttancc of the alleged agT0ement into evidence.

Amwllant in hi:-:; brief cites Pages 175, 218, 244, 251
amJ 2G4 of the transcript of Proeeedings as evidence that

tl!P Conrt errPd in

''continnall~-

refusing the admission

ol' Exliiliit 10-D and in

final1~-

allowing its admission on

a eowlitin1wJ basis."

(Brid for Appellant, page 4).

"\ reading of tlw pages in the transcript of Proceedillg:-i ci kd by,\ ppellant, and pag('S before and after those

cdc1l, 1\ ill conyi:1n· tlu• n•ader that Appellant on different
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occasions prematurely offered Exhibit 10-D ''rithou1
offering evidence that proper notice was sent to Vander
pool (T. 244, 251).
However, assuming, but not conceding, that the Cour:
erred in admitting Exhibit 10-D into evidence, the error
did not constitute reversable error. In any event, an~
possible error was rectified when Exhibit 10-D was ad
mitted on a conditional basis.
Appellant's evidence that the condition precedent wai
complied w:th consisted of testimony that a letter ad
dressed to Crowder (Exhibit 8-D) was mailed to Chinchilla Guild of America, Eastern Division (T. 260). Crow
der did not rememlier receiving the letter (T. 217, 221.
250, 251). At most the evidence raised a question of fact
as to whether the condition had been complied with a:
pertaining to Vanderpool. Also, Vanderpool testifiec
that the instrument was signed in blank with the under·
standing that when Hargis obtained evidence of th~
proper amount to fill in the blanks, Crowder and Vander
pool would make another trip back to Salt Lake City arn!
haye the blank filled in and completed and the agreemen:
would be effected (Tr. 131). Clearly, Exhibit 10-D, if ad
missible at all, was only admissible on a conditional basi>
If the court erred it was in admitting Exhibit 10-D
into evidence even on a conditional basis. The rule ii
stated in 29 Am .•Tur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 198, Page 251,
as follows:

9
"'rhe presumption that a letter properly mailed
was received by the addressee is not conclusive,
hilt ma:1· lw rebutted by evidence showing that the
ldt('l' was not in fact received. Some authority
liolds that thr: preswnption is entirely overcome by
the uncontradictcd testimony of the addressee that
thp, letter i,vas ne1Jer received ... " (citing Camp7Jell r. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, lOOP 397 and other
case's, emphasis added.)

Jn Cam fJl;efl

1·.

Gowans, Supra at 284, the Supreme

Cnnrt of Utah stated:

"The mailing of a letter postpaid and properly
addressed to a person slmwn to reside in a city or
tffwn to \Vhich the letter was addressed creates
no h•gal prrsumption, bnt a presumption or inference of fact, that it reached its destination.
The tE•stimony of the witness Milner is therefore
some evidence that the letter testified to by him
was received hy tht- Go\vanses in the due course
of mail. The defendants, however, testified that
no such letter as testified to by Milner was received hy them. On such question we think the· evidence prer)()nderates in favor of the defendants

"

Crowder h'slifird that he did not remember receiving
tlit> l< tter ('l1. 217, 221, 250, 251) and there is therefore no
in·t•i;llmption that tlw condition was mPt and Exhibit 10-D
1nts i11<pro1i<c•rly rPePivrd into e1·idPnce on a conditional
liasis.
0
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The Court shonld lurn' not allowP<l I~xhihit 10-D
admitted into e\·idcnce for another r<'ason. As llargi,,
testified, he was to s0nd noticP to hoth Crowdn· and
Yanderpool, Lut d;J not sl·rnl nofo·p to Yandeqiool (T.
246). rl'he ktter 1Yas 1nitten to Cro·wder only (Exhibit
S-D). Since no not!cP 1rns S('nt to Ynnderpool (T. 2-l:GJ
and since tho letter was writtt>n to Crowder only, for ]fr
''Pdification" (Exhibit 8-D), the condition was not corn
plied with as far as Y ~nderpool ·was concerned and Exhibit 10-D ~;honl<l not han been admitted ev0n on n
conditional liasis.
POINT II
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY SHOULD BE AFFIRJ'.IED

Appellant contrnds that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidenc<-' pre~rntl'd h.1: Plaintiff and show~
clearly that the jnry was v.clversely affected by the l'lTOn
eons rulings of the Court on Plaintiff's obj('ctions and
the attitude of the Court towards eonm;d for tlw Dl~fond
ant.
The principal is well Pstahlished that 1dwnPVl'r tlwrt
is dispnte in the evidence, it is the dnty of the Suvrcrn 1•
Conrt on revie1Y to accqJt as fact that e1·idencP and tlll'
reasonahle infercncPs to h0 drawn tlwrdrom which sn11
ports the jury verdict. First Security Bank of Utah 1.
E.::ra C. Lundahl, l11c., 22 Utah 2d ______ , 454 P.2J ~'.SG. See
also Ncimaun v. Grand Ce11tral illurkct, Inc. 9 l~tah 2(1

4G, 337 P.2d 42-1-
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The jury could reasonably have found from the evid('r(: pn·sented to it the facts as stated in Respondent's
~iah·m0nt of Faets from which it could have reasonably,
validly and lawfnllv auivPd at the verdict it rendered.
A eardnl reading of the trial transcript will show
that tlw Court did not err in its rulings on Plaintiff's obj<>ctions, that it maintainPd a proper attitude towards
eounsel for the Defendant and that it did not otherwise
('IT to tli(~ prejudice of DPfendant.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NUl\IBER 9.

Dnring the trial Appellant did not object to the ad1•1ission of E'videnrl', nor did hP ask the Court to strike
out evidPm·e, rPgarding the agency of Crowder to act
for Hargis on the ground that agency was never pleaded
Jiy Plaintiff ('r. 12:1, 1:34, 13G, 203, 223).
ln fact, Appellant's argmnrnt at trial appeared to
lw. that Plaintiff failed to shmv agency that would authori'."C' Crowder to sign tlw notes ( T. 20G).
Plaintiff'" Ansi\·ers to Interrogatories state in detail
tlw ag<·nc:· n·lntiom;hip between Hargis and Cro''Tder (R.
L"i-2~i). ;\ttac11<·d to tlte Answ0rs is a eop,\· of the $2,000.00
['rnn1\.ssnn- Note sned upon (R. 2:3).
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The general rule reganl;ng plt>ading agency has lwer
variously stated as follo\\·s:
"Generall>· it is lwld, in tlw ahsenct' of cxprE»·
statutory provision, that in aetions on contract.
either by or against the vrincipal, there is n1
necessity of alleging that the contract was ex1
cnted throngh an agent; in other ·words, the con
tract may he pleaded as if it 1vere the contraeof the principal, without mentioning the agency
The theory of tl1is rnle of pleading is that the ac
of th:• agent is the act of tlH' 11rincipal, and heme
ma~· lie cl~ dared upon as sncl•. An additional rn
son ~dva~ieed in sn1Jport of tLt· general rnle is tlia
it would :<lYfJl' ~:trongly of pleading p\·idence, 01
at least n·dm1dancy, for the pleader to state tha·
the lrnsiness 1. mdPr consid<>ration was done l)y ai
agent or that, having been transacted without tl1
Defendant's sanrtion, it was afte>nrnrds ratifo1
lJ>. him." 3 Am ..Jnl'. 2d, Agency, Sec. 343, pag·
700.
1

"It is clear that nnder the general rule npholdinr
a pleading stating that the princip:il hirn:wlf per
formed the act sued npon, tl1 P agent, since he is no
even mentioned, n<•ecl not lw named or othcnri~
icl0ntific"d.'' 45 A.L.R. 2cl 597, RPc. 7.

"It is a W<'ll-settlled rnlP of pleading that in ac

tions on contracts e>ither hy or against the princi
lial, tht~rP is no necesity of all<>ging that the co11
tract was exceut0d throngh an agent; or in othrr
word:>, the' contract may lw pleaded as if it weP
the eontract of the principal, witJ1011t rnentionin~
the agency ... " S9 A.L.R S95.
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In fact the rule is stated in 89 A.L.R. 896 that "when
an action is brought on a contract made by an agent, it
is both customary and proper to plead the contract as
that of the principal; and if the execution of the contract
is dPnied, the Plaintiff must prove both its execution
and the authority of the person by whom it was executed."
(Emphasis added.)
It is surimitted that the rule governing contracts is ap-

plicahlti to promissory notes.

It is snhmitted that Respondent was not required to
plr·ad agenc.\'· However, in any event, agency was suffi<'.ientl.v srwlled out in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories and Appellant waived any defense of failure to
plead agt~ncy ·when he failed to object to the admission
of evidence regarding agency or when he failed to request
that evidr'nee regarding agency be Htricken.
Appellant failed during the trial to object to the admision of evidence, nor did he request the court to strike
unt PvidPrwe, rt-garding ratification (T. 136, 146, 148, 205,
227).

In good consciencP, Appellant could not object to evi-

d(•nee n"garding ratification. Note the following dialogue
rwtw<'<'n tlw Court and .Mr. Bisliop, Appellant's attorney,

fonnr1

()TI

ceeding8:

rages 20G and 207 of the transcript of Pro-
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COURT: No, both of the witness(•s hay,
now testified l\Jr. Hargis s::ti<l hP would take car,
of the notPf'.
"THI~

MR. BU~IIOP: I ?rill :1raut he said tl1at. TVe 7rn1
admitted a!! alon.IJ he irns goi11g to take care of
by getting rnonPy from C'~·owder; 1d1en Crowdc:
filed bankrnpct~·, not going to take on :rn~ihim
for him. (Emphasis acld0d.)
l\IR. ClOTTFi1EDSON: Based on that admission.
I wo'1ld like to rnov<> for a dir('etccl verdict; tl1t'11
is no-

MR. BI8!IC'P: I can't admit anything for

lll\

client on tl1at hasis."

The record is yoid of any denial by Hargis that l1
told Yanderpool and Crowder on separate occasions tlw
he 1rnnld pay the two not<'s.
Appellant's citrd authority in his Point III (Bri1
for Appe.Jlant, page 5, G) is not aJllJlicahlf• to his argnme1(
In 45 A.L.R. 583, from whieh Ap1wlant's authorit
was taken the qnestion discuf'sed is the snfficiency of ti:
pleading once agl•ncy has been 1ileadc•d, F'or instance•, H
article statE•s the geiwral rule at page 58G as follows:
it is a g-t•rn•ral rule in most ;jnris<lictio11
that om• suing npon a contract mack for t11P OJ
posing iiarty lw an a;<.£(•nl ner·d not orclinari

''Sinet~

1
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ref er io the agency at all in his pleadings, but; may
allege the legal effect of the agent's action by
nxt'rring that the contract was made by the principal hirnst•lf, it is not surprising that the courts
havP permitted to a large degree of generality in
pleadings in which th0 party attempting to enforce
the contract against the principal attempts to aff i nna ti 1.1ely allrqe tllP. aqe11cy. (Emphasis added)

Again, in the section from which Appellant took
l1is qnote, tl1P article at Page 610 states:
"As a general rule, an inadequacy or ambiguity in
on (!llcgation of authori.zed agency is cured by an
allegation in the same pleading to the effect that
tliP part~' ratifiPd the transaction.

In othPr words, if agency is pleaded, it is pleaded
:-;11fficientl)· if a technical ratificaton is properly pleaded.
1t is submitted that the law does not require that
ratification he pleaded. Also, enn assmning that the law
is to th0 contrary, Appellant waived objection thereto
'.Yh<·n Jw allmn~d ratification, when he, through his attort1('Y admitt(·d rntification, and "'hen he failed to deny
ratifiration.
POINT IV
IN THE ABSENSE OF A SHOWING BY APPELLANT OF
GROSS IN.JUSTICE OR INEQUITY, HE MAY NOT ASSIGN
A:C~ ERROR THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION 10 SINCE HE
FAILED TO TAKE EXCEPTION THERETO.
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Appellant failed to ohj('Ct at the trial to the giving
of instruction 10 (T. 325-827) and may not now do so un.
less he shows injnstice or inrqt1it~- and special circum.
stances warranting dC'partnre from the general rule, that
a party nnrnt stat<> distinctly the matter to ·which lie ol1jects and the grounds for ohjPetion or he will be pn.
eluded from assigning tht• giving of such instruction.
Utah Rul<'s of Ciril Proced11re, Rul<> 51, ill cCall v. Ken
drick, 2 Utah 2d 3G4, 274 P.2d 9G2.

It is re;.:pectfolly submitted that tlH' statement in Ajf
pellant's br:ef ''no argmrn•nt nece~san·" does not me~1
the requirernen t:; sta tt•d in tlw cas<' and rulP above n
ferred to (Brief for .\p1;ellant Page 6).
Hm\·ever, even assuming, hut not conceding, that Ar
pellant has sho-wn or will lw ahl<" to show gross injustic1
or inequity and special circmnstances warranting depar
ture from the general rule, YanclP]JOol, Hargis and Crow
der all testified that the purported agreement was subjec:
to a condition precedent. (T. 181, 24+). The pnrporte

1

agreement contained a condition prc'crdent (Exhibit 10-D
Note also Instruction 11 (T. GS) which phras<'S the

que~,

tion of a condition precedrnt favoralily 1o AjlJJ<•llant.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTJO)
NUMBER 13.
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Contrary to Appellant's contention, agency was an
is;;nP in the case and the jury could reasonably have found
that Crowder \ms acting within the scope of his authority
(T. 123, 1:24, J 34, 135, 203, 233, I~xhihit 1-P).
Contrary to Appellant's contention that the Court
failed to in::-;trnct the jury that the burden of proving an
agent's anthority to borrow money is on the person borrowing the money, the court so instructed the jury. See Instruction 6 (R. 6:J), Instruction 9 (R. 66), Instruction 13
(R. 70) and Instruction 19 (R. 76).
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
~Ui\IBERED

14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.

Ap1wllant contends that the above-stated instructions
C•1,rc~ clnplicitious, unduly repetitious and do not contain a
ll'ull statenwnt of the law.

\\·

Rn'n assuming, but not conceding, that the abovetakd instructions are duplicitous and repetitious, Appelt
"' ant rnust show both error and prejudice, that is, that his
Dubdantial rights are affected, before he is entitled to
L~~1reyail. Startin L Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834;
\ee abo,Ufuh Hulrs of Civil Proccdurf., Rule 61.

et'

It is snhmitted that the aboYe-stated instructions were
pt duplicitous
and repetitious but that, in any event, the
10.
.
.
ibstanbal ng-hts of Appellant were not affected thereby.

I~

Each of tlw instructions given by the Conrt, ·whP:
considered in acconlance with instruction 27 (T. 82) tlia
the instructions given by tlH· court are to be considen:
and constnwd by tliv jury a." ont> eonnected whole, ar
in accordane<> with w<>ll sdtl<'d la\\'. For instance, n•garr!
mg:
Instrnction 14 sPe

(iralwm r. Ashley, 392 P.2d GG7, 74 Nl\I 231
]{ en11edy v. J11st1is, 325 P.2d 716, 64 Nl\I 131
49 Am .•Jnr. St. of Frauds, Section 405;
:; Arn. Jnr. ~d, Agency, Sc'ction 70;
t:niforrn Commercial Code 70.A-3-403; UU
195~.

regarding Tnstruetion 15 see
3 Arn. Jnr. 2d Agency, Sections GS-73;
regarding Instruction 1G see
Uniform Commercial Code 70A3-403 (1);
regarding Instruction 20 see
Uniform Co1mnercial Code, 70-A-3-404;
regarding Instruction 21 see

Moses v. McFarland, 119 Utah G02, 230 P.~·
571;
rPgarding Instruction 23 see

Cram v. Bt'ippery, 155 P.2d 558, 175 or 577
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Tnstnwtions J 7, 18 nd 19 are in accordance with general
law so well settled that citations therefore are unnecessary. However, even assuming error, it was harmless to
the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The Trjal Conrt did not err in admitting evidence
nor in denying admittance of evidence offered. Appellant has failed to show where the verdict of the jury
was contrary to the evidence presented. Appellant has
not shown error in the instructions and if error there be
it was harmless in view of the instructions viewed as a
whole.

The verdict of the jury should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON
NIELSEN,CONDER, HANSEN
&HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

